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Center on Quality Policing

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TECHNICAL
REPORT

Selected International Best Practices in Police Performance Measurement

Robert C. Davis

Modern law enforcement agencies engage in a broad spectrum of work, including key functions such as crime prevention, promoting traffic safety and responding to vehicular accidents, monitoring and preventing drug sales and use and other types of social disorder, and building strong partnerships with interest groups in communities. Knowing how agencies are performing in these realms is important to municipal councils, mayors, and other entities to which law enforcement agencies are accountable. In a time of tight budgets and deep cuts in municipal services, local officials are likely to demand measurable evidence of quality improvement to justify budget requests.

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TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY**

Police executives have a strong stake in measuring performance as a tool to monitor department operations and promote adherence to agency policies and strategic plans. By defining what is measured, executives send a signal to their command about what activities are valued and what results are considered important. Performance measures can help administrators track morale within the organization, whether funds are being used efficiently, whether individual officers are headed for trouble, and a host of other barometers that indicate health or dysfunction in an organization. Performance indicators also can aid police executives in assessing and responding to claims of racial bias, patterns of abusive behavior, or failure to protect.

This report examines some recent recommendations about how police performance should be measured, discusses considerations in designing performance measures, and presents some best practices from around the world. It concludes with a synthesis of the elements that the international best practices have in common.

Performance Measures Conceptualized

Apprehension of criminals is historically the central rationale for policing, but, in fact, calls for police services incorporate a wide range of complaints. Modern police officers must be prepared to act in a variety of roles, from problem-solver to counselor and provider of first aid, among many others (Greene, 2010). Yet, historically, Western police agencies have measured their performance against a very restricted set of crime-focused indicators, such as crime rates, arrests, response times, and clearance rates (Couper, 1983). More recently, these measures have begun to include a focus on “value for money.”

Much recent thinking has argued that police performance measures need to incorporate a wider set of concerns tied to the precepts of democratic policing. As a result of its expanded role in shaping law enforcement functions in failed states in the 1990s, the United Nations articulated a set of principles for police agencies that included applying the law equally to all citizens, guidance on the use of deadly force, guarantees of safety and fair treatment of persons detained or arrested, allowing the community to hold law enforcement officials accountable for their actions, and protecting the rights of women, juveniles, and refugees.

International policing expert David Bayley later expanded on these principles. He argued that, first, democratic policing means adherence to the rule of law rather than to the whims of public authorities. Second, police must protect civil rights—from the right of free speech and association to freedom from torture and other forms of abuse. Third, democratic policing should imply that police are *externally accountable* to government bodies, oversight commissions, and/or the courts. Finally, democratic policing should give top priority to meeting the security needs of private citizens (Bayley, 2006).

Other experts have adopted similar positions on democratic policing. Greene (2010, p. 5) argued that policing is about the allocation of human rights: “The police are at the forefront of securing, upholding, and reaffirming rights to assure the dignity of individuals, for peaceful assembly free of fear and reprisal, for free speech, for civic participation, for due process....”

In a similar vein, Skolnick (1999, p. 7) wrote that democratic policing needs to maintain a balance between “the touchstones of public safety, openness, and accountability.”

Bayley also argued that measurement is critical to maintaining a healthy balance between controlling crime and protecting the rights of citizens:

Reform requires adopting a mind-set that puts a premium on judging itself by the demonstrable achievement of objectives. Adopting this mind-set is the primary

way that the objective of being effective in crime control, the primary rationale for police, can be squared with the obligation to be humane, with which effectiveness often seems to come into conflict. (Bayley, 2006, p. 57)

There have been several attempts to capture the multidimensional and sometimes conflicting concerns of police agencies.

In recent years, there have been several attempts to capture the multidimensional and sometimes conflicting concerns of police agencies. Harvard criminologists Mark Moore and Anthony Braga (2003) argued that only by adopting a comprehensive and multifaceted measurement system of police performance will police chiefs or other reformers have a chance to drive the organization to higher levels of performance or to shift the organization's direction. They proposed seven relevant dimensions of performance measurement:

- *Reducing crime and victimization.* Although some experts (e.g., Bayley, 1994) have argued that crime is beyond the control of the police, the consensus today is that reducing crime is the single most important contribution that police make to the well-being of society.
- *Holding offenders accountable (clearance and conviction rates).* Calling offenders to account is desirable both because punishment can prevent and deter offenders from committing future crimes and because meting out justice goes a ways toward restoring equity.
- *Reducing fear and enhancing security (feel safe in home, neighborhood).* Fear of victimization is one of the principal costs of crime. It is linked to victimization rates, but it is also influenced by other factors, including disorderly conditions.
- *Increasing safety and order in public spaces (e.g., reduce traffic accidents, increase public use of parks).* In today's anonymous cities, the police help ensure that strangers interact with each other according to expectations in public spaces.
- *Using force sparingly and fairly (minimize shootings, promote racial equality).* In order to pursue goals of increasing public safety and controlling crime, society gives the police special powers that they in turn need to use judiciously and equitably.
- *Using public funds efficiently and fairly (deploy officers fairly, keep costs down).* Society expects the police to operate economically and to control costs in a responsible manner.
- *Enhancing "customer" satisfaction.* The police provide many services to the public above and beyond crime fighting. Providing good service to citizens increases police legitimacy.

Moore and Braga's dimensions emphasize the importance of accountability to the public both as customers of policing services and as owners or investors in the police

“enterprise.” Their comprehensive view of what should be measured in police departments is informed by the “balanced scorecard” approach used to assess private-sector enterprises. In the United States, the use of municipal indicators can be traced to the balanced scorecard approach developed and popularized by the Harvard Business School (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Balanced scorecards were designed to permit managers to quickly assess the status of their business by making available a broad range of indicators of finances, customer satisfaction, and other aspects of business performance. The concept allows managers to assess their organizations from several distinct vantage points, including the customer perspective (How do customers see us?), the internal business perspective (What must we excel at?), the innovation and learning perspective (How can we improve and create value?), and the shareholder perspective (How do we look to shareholders?).

Like Moore and Braga, policing expert Stephen Mastrofski (1999) has emphasized both the need for measures that capture diverse policing outcomes and the importance of considering transactions with the public as an integral part of any measurement scheme. In fact, Mastrofski’s main concern is holding the police accountable for service to the public: “What do people associate with good service from the police?” He argues for six domains of performance indicators, shown in the text box.

Mastrofski does not provide a scheme to develop metrics to assess the domains of performance. However, he does put forward an interesting methodology to gather data on performance. He suggests that officers complete a checklist of activities that are relevant to various types of citizen encounters they experience in their work. Recognizing that this method of accountability would likely result in serious misinterpretations by the officers filling out the self-report form, he recommends that officers provide citizens with a receipt for the encounter that summarizes the officer’s account of the incident. Citizens could use the receipt to track the progress of an investigation and could also use it to challenge the officer’s version of what transpired during the encounter.

In sum, policing experts agree that performance measurement systems should capture the complex set of expectations that modern society has of the police, including service to citizens who request assistance and humane treatment of persons detained or held in custody. Performance measures are a primary method of ensuring that the police are held accountable in democratic societies.

Designing Performance Measures

Performance measures should be multidimensional to capture the complexity inherent in modern policing. Policing experts have proposed several considerations in developing performance indicators. A number of the most salient factors are discussed here.

Outcomes Versus Outputs

A basic consideration in developing performance measures is the difference between outcomes and outputs. *Outputs* are measures of internal performance that are highly correlated with desirable policing outcomes. Outputs are under the direct control of the police. For example, the number of arrests for prostitution is an output: Police agencies can put more or less effort into undercover observation or conducting stings against prostitutes and thereby increase or decrease the number of arrests. *Outcomes*, on the other hand, are societal benefits that the police produce. An example of an outcome would be residents' feelings of safety. The police can potentially influence perceptions of safety through community policing, crime prevention, and other actions. However, there are other factors that affect feelings of safety that may, in fact, exert a greater influence on the metric than actions taken by police officers. One high-profile homicide in a neighborhood may overwhelm any reassuring actions taken by the police.

Both outcomes and outputs have benefits and drawbacks. Outcomes are desirable because they set a target for the police but leave it up to the police to choose the means to achieve the target. However, because outcomes are influenced by factors outside the control of the police, they are said to be *noisy* (i.e., they measure what the police do in a very imperfect manor). This alters the risk/reward ratio for officers. Officers must decide whether it is worth their effort to engage in actions that might increase feelings of safety in the community while reducing their efforts in other areas of performance. The noisier the measure, the less the incentive for officers to try to influence the outcome. Choosing outcomes with a good deal of noise also allows police agencies to cite excuses that attribute poor outcomes to factors beyond the control of the police (Vollaard, 2006).

Mastrofski's Six Domains of Performance

Attentiveness: A visible police presence

Reliability: A quick, predictable response

Responsiveness: Attempts to satisfy people's requests and explain reasons for actions and decisions

Competence: Know how to handle criminals, victims, and the public

Manners: Treat *all* people with respect

Fairness: Equitable treatment for all—especially racial equality

Outputs are desirable because the police can directly influence them. Thus, outputs create stronger incentives for officers to behave in certain ways than do performance measures that target outcomes. However, outputs also encourage the police to “game” the system. In other words, police officers or agencies, as a whole, are encouraged to focus solely on increasing certain easily quantifiable outputs and ignore other actions that might have a more profound effect on socially desirable policing outcomes. For

example, using the output DWI (driving while intoxicated) arrests as a performance measure is likely to increase the number of DWI checkpoints, but it may simultaneously decrease moving traffic stops and thereby encourage speeders. Baker (2002) argues that the more controllable performance measures are, the more likely they are to lead to undesirable behavioral effects. Setting targets for traffic tickets, for example, may lead to many marginal citations near the end of a reporting period. Using outputs as performance indicators may also lead to outright dishonesty in an effort to increase performance statistics. A number of years ago, the Philadelphia Police Department found itself involved in a scandal when the media discovered that hundreds of sexual assault cases had been stuffed, uninvestigated, into a drawer. The incidents never made it onto the books because department administrators had communicated that they would hold district commanders responsible for reducing the number of violent crimes.

One high-profile homicide may overwhelm any reassuring actions taken by the police.

Interpretability of Measures

Many individual measures derived from agency records may have ambiguous interpretations. For example, does a high number of crime complaints indicate an increase in victimization (a bad thing) or an increase in people's confidence in the police (a good thing)? Does a high number of arrests indicate that the police are engaging in aggressive enforcement (a good thing) or that they are not being proactive and are allowing crimes to occur (a bad thing)? High numbers of citizen complaints may indicate an abusive police force, but they may be an indication that the complaint process is well publicized and the filing process is free of barriers. Thus, ambiguity is inherent in many performance measures derived from agency records (Kelling, 1992).

This difficulty of interpretation is exactly why it is important not to rely on individual measures but, rather, to examine a set of indicators. Individual measures may be misleading, but looking at patterns in a set of indicators is likely to give a better picture of an agency's level of professionalism. An analysis by New York's Vera Institute of Justice summed up this rule:

It follows, then, that an indicator should rarely be used on its own. To interpret changes in ambiguous indicators, you should always use a group or "basket" of indicators relating to the same policy objective. Baskets of indicators provide a more valid, reliable, and rounded view of policy progress. (Vera Institute of Justice, 2003, p. 7).

Officer surveys provide insight into the level of professionalism in an agency.

Research is needed to determine the meaning of some indicators based on agency records. For example, the number of citizen complaints in a policing district could be correlated with a less ambiguous measure of police behavior in interactions with citizens derived through observation or citizen satisfaction with the interaction. These latter measures—more clearly indicators of officer behavior but more expensive to produce—could be used to determine the validity of citizen complaints as a measure of police abuse.

Survey measures often have clearer interpretations than data derived from agency records. This is because they focus on socially desirable outcomes rather than policing outputs. For example, officer integrity can be directly measured by *climate and culture surveys*. These surveys are a much clearer measure of the climate of integrity than are output measures, such as departmental policies or the amount of ethics training that officers receive.

Community surveys involve interviewing a random or representative sample of the community to gauge people's opinions of police effectiveness or police misconduct. Research has shown that these two dimensions of police performance are largely unrelated (Davis, Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller, 2005). They can also be used to measure rates of voluntary (citizen-initiated) and involuntary (police-initiated) contact between citizens and police officers or to identify subgroups of the population that are less satisfied with police services. Community surveys are strongly influenced by respondent demographics, neighborhood context, and media coverage of the police (see, e.g., Miller and Davis, 2008). This can be a drawback if the main concern is measuring police performance. However, the police work in a political environment, and taking the temperature of a community, including the intrusion of political views in such surveys, is useful. Additional questions can be added to attempt to unpack the reasons behind opinions of the police. *Retail surveys* are a variation of community surveys that assess the satisfaction of the business community with police services.

Contact surveys assess the quality of interactions between police and citizens using samples derived from screens in community surveys or lists of persons stopped or helped by the police. Rather than asking for global opinions of the police, contact surveys ask respondents to assess the specific behaviors of police officers during a particular encounter (such as whether they were courteous or gave appropriate information). Unlike in community surveys, research has shown that demographics (ethnicity, age, gender, education) do not strongly influence respondents' opinions of the police in contact surveys. People seem to be able to separate their global opinions of the police from the behavior of officers during a discrete incident relatively easily (Davis, Henderson, and Cheryachukin, 2004).

Officer surveys provide insight into the level of professionalism in an agency. Officer surveys have been used to assess officer job satisfaction, perceptions of agency leadership, knowledge of how to handle common policing situations, and support for new policies or reform efforts. They have also been used to measure officer morale and

adherence to principles of integrity. In the latter application, officers rate their approval or disapproval of questionable or unethical conduct, including such scenarios as accepting free meals from merchants, accepting cash in exchange for not issuing a speeding ticket, turning in a lost wallet only after removing cash, or beating a car thief after a chase. Research has confirmed the validity of climate and culture surveys: There is a substantial disparity among police agencies in terms of the “environment of integrity,” with those departments independently recognized as progressive scoring the highest on the survey measures. Research has further suggested that police managers are largely responsible for setting the tone for rank-and-file officers (Klockars et al., 2000).

Adjusting for Context

Police organizations exist in different environments and therefore have different inputs. Community demographics, the volume of tourist traffic, and union work rules, to name just a few, are likely to affect departmental outputs. When comparing agencies (or subunits of agencies), some method of *risk adjustment* is necessary (Maguire, 2004). One way to adjust for risk is to stratify, or form peer groups of like agencies or subunits. Comparisons can then be made within the peer group. This is the approach used by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in the UK, as discussed later in this report. At a crude level, small agencies can be compared with other small agencies and larger agencies with larger agencies.

Another method of adjusting for risk is to adjust performance measures statistically. Such adjustments can be based on measurable risk factors, such as poverty, transience, unemployment, and other readily available factors related to crime rates, community opinion of the police, and other policing outcomes (Sherman, 1998).

Ultimately, when comparing across police agencies or subunits, performance measures can, at best, give an indication that one agency is different from its apparent peers. Differences in the agency’s environment, in the efficiency of data collection methods, or in operating procedures can lead to apparently anomalous results. Thus, the value of a set of measures is to indicate that something is anomalous and to trigger additional investigation into whether there is a good reason for the observed anomalies.

Tying Performance to Incentives

Some municipalities have experimented with tying incentives to police performance. This can be done in several ways. One option is to provide additional resources for agencies or subunits that underperform. For example, an agency with a high crime rate may be given additional resources on the theory that filling this need will mitigate the problem. However, rewarding poor performance creates a perverse incentive to underperform.

Linking incentives with superior performance through contracts makes more sense from an econometrics perspective. Mohar (2010) reported that the state of Querétaro, Mexico, had significant success using incentives. Indicators were used as part of a program to provide incentives to municipal police agencies for reform efforts. Rather

than generating statistical data, the effort focused on the adoption of professional standards by participating agencies, such as the development of a use-of-force policy. According to Mohar, the project resulted in marked reforms in a short time and increased police officers' pride in their agencies.

Nonetheless, in analyzing an experiment with incentive contracts in the Netherlands, Vollaard (2003) argued that such contracts reduce flexibility in responding to developing problems that may not have been foreseen at the time the contracts were established. At the national level, then, incentive contracts may limit the authority of local agencies to respond to idiosyncratic problems. Vollaard also argued that incentives could serve to exacerbate the tendency of local police subunits or individual officers to game the system.

To recap, it is important in designing a system of performance measures to keep in mind the possibility that the act of measuring may affect the behavior of officers in ways that are unintended and contradictory to agency goals. By employing a mix of outcomes and outputs, including survey measures in the mix of indicators, and adjusting indicators to make comparisons fairer, performance measures can become an effective tool to promote accountability and adherence to agency strategic goals.

When comparing performance across police agencies, some method of risk adjustment is necessary.

A Framework for Measuring the Performance of Police Organizations

Building on these concepts, [Tables 1–3](#) present a rudimentary scheme for assessing the quality of policing. The scheme envisions three types of measures: An assessment of the departmental policies that condition the behavior of police officers, which, in turn, results in certain (preferably desirable) policing outcomes. The pattern can be visualized in the following way:

Policies & practices → Officer behavior → Desirable outcomes

[Table 1](#) breaks out the types of *process measures* that might be collected to assess whether agency policies and practices are consistent with professional standards. The process measures are essentially a set of checklists indicating whether an agency has adopted a particular policy or practice. They include an examination of policies on use of force and traffic and pedestrian stops, an evaluation of the scope of training programs, an assessment of agency early warning systems, an examination of policies related to transparency, and an assessment of agency interaction with the community through citizen advisory councils, public attendance at community meetings, and other forums. Data collection for the process measures is the least expensive among the three approaches presented here, based on a review of agency policies and agency records.¹

Table 1
Process Measures

Indicator	Definition	Source
Police policies	Do policies on use of force and traffic/pedestrian stops conform to national best practices?	Analysis of written policies
Training programs	Hours of academy and in-service training on use of force, stops, ethnic sensitivity	Analysis of training curriculum
Early warning system	Databases on, e.g., tracking citizen complaints received by officers, use of force, stops	Analysis of early warning system specifications
Transparency	Publishing of data on, e.g., crime complaints, arrests, stops, use of force, citizen complaints	Analysis of departmental reports, website
Community interface	Establishment of citizen advisory council, public attendance at open district meetings, citizen participation in anti-crime activities	Analysis of data from departmental records, observation of meetings

Agency policies and practices condition officer behavior, so the second set of performance measures relate to officer conduct (see [Table 2](#)). These measures include the degree of professionalism with which officers conduct themselves in their interactions with the public, the volume and disposition of citizen complaints filed with the agency's internal affairs division or with a citizen complaint agency, and officer outlook and morale, including job satisfaction, perceptions of agency leadership, and climate of integrity. Some of these measures are based on relatively inexpensive Internet surveys of officers or brief phone surveys assessing satisfaction of persons who call upon the police for assistance or who are detained by the police.

Performance measures do not have to involve sophisticated information technology.

Agency policies and practices and officer conduct determine the quality of policing services delivered, so the final set of performance measures assess agency outcomes (see [Table 3](#)). These include crime rates (adjusted for community demographics), response times, clearance rates, willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police, and community opinion of the police. The last two measures require fielding community surveys, a relatively expensive undertaking that involves contracting with a professional

survey firm capable of conducting scientific sampling to ensure a representative sample of the community. Nonetheless, the outcome measures in Table 3 are very basic. Measures of efficiency (e.g., cost of police services per community resident), sparing use of force, and a host of more sophisticated and targeted outcomes could be added to the set of outcome measures proposed here. As discussed earlier, some these measures have multiple interpretations or meanings that are ambiguous because of measurement issues. Therefore, it is best to examine a set of indicators rather than focus on single measures: Results that diverge from expectations should be cause for further investigation and examination of more refined measures.

Performance measures do not have to involve sophisticated information technology capabilities. Even a rudimentary set of measures can provide police administrators and municipal officials with valuable information with which to evaluate agency effectiveness and the success of strategic plans.

International Performance Measurement Best Practices

RAND is in the process of conducting a study for the Bureau of Justice Assistance that involves gathering information on international best policing practices. Based on interviews with more than 130 police executives and other policing experts around the world, the RAND team compiled three dozen best-practice candidates in 18 domains of police activity. One of those domains was performance measurement. This section summarizes performance measurement systems from four of the countries that employed best practices.

Table 2
Officer Conduct Measures

Indicator	Definition	Source
Handling of routine incidents	Professionalism of officers when interacting with persons requesting assistance or stopped by the police	Brief surveys to assess satisfaction of “consumers” of police services
Citizen complaints	Number of citizen complaints, rate at which complaints sustained, proportion of officers disciplined	Analysis of annual reports of complaint agency
Officer morale and ethics	Officer job satisfaction and “climate of integrity”	Surveys of police officers

Table 3
Outcome Measures

Indicator	Definition	Source
Community opinion	Public opinions of police effectiveness and police misconduct	Surveys of randomly selected community members
Crime rates	Rates of reported crime and criminal victimization, adjusted for community demographics	Analysis of records management system data and/or surveys of randomly selected community members
Citizen cooperation with the police	Willingness of citizens to report crimes and non-crime problems to the police	Surveys of randomly selected community members
Response times	Time to respond to emergency and non-emergency calls for service	Analysis of data from departmental records
Clearance rates	Proportion of crime reports cleared by arrest	Analysis of data from departmental records

England and Wales

England and Wales have the most comprehensive performance measurement program of any country. The Home Office instituted the Policing Performance Assessment Framework in 2004 in an attempt to bring the quality of police performance measurement up to the levels that had been developed for other public services. The measures were designed to monitor progress toward achieving key priorities set forth in the National Policing Plan. Initially, the set of indicators announced in 2004 included 35 measures to monitor the performance of regional police forces. The effort was overseen by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), which audited the data collection process among local police forces. The statistics that were generated allowed year-by-year comparisons and comparisons across police forces. The Home Office performance assessment website allowed citizens to see at a glance how their local force was doing relative to other forces.

The centralized target-driven culture in British policing led to accusations of forces focusing solely on the crimes on which they were being measured rather than those that most affected local communities. For example, in 2005, the Home Office decreed ten crime types on which it most wanted the 43 police forces to focus for the next three years, with financial rewards given for good performance. One of these was the bicycle theft, a high-volume crime in inner London and university cities but one that constitutes just a handful of offenses in rural areas. This led to some forces being admonished for large percentage increases in cycle theft even though the numerical increase was miniscule. In other areas, crime types that were a real issue for local people but were not

on the list (e.g., non-dwelling burglary, criminal damage to a motor vehicle) were not being given the attention required because the forces were not being monitored on their performance.

A New Emphasis on Local Control. Several years ago, the government changed the performance measurement system dramatically, creating the Police Report Card, which measured performance along four dimensions:

- local crime and policing
- satisfaction and confidence
- protection from serious harm
- value for money.

RAND compiled three dozen potential best practices in 18 domains of police activity.

The HMIC displayed the results on a publicly accessible website, allowing citizens to examine in detail their force's performance in each of the four domains. ([Appendix A](#) includes a sample report card.) Graphics indicate the force's "grade" in each area and whether performance is improving, remaining steady, or declining. The website also lists several similar forces and allows users to compare the performance of their police force with that of the similar forces. Finally, it also allows users to investigate the sources of the information used in making the assessments.

The most controversial aspect of the new system was that it set a single national target based on a measure of public confidence from the British Crime Survey. The idea of a single confidence indicator was an attempt to be more citizen-focused so that forces and neighborhood policing teams could more accurately address the issues most relevant to local people, rather than a blanket target. The measure itself was based on the question, "How much would you agree or disagree that the police and the local council are dealing with the anti-social behaviour and crime issues that matter in this area?" This question is asked annually in the British Crime Survey, a wide-ranging independent survey that seeks to obtain reliable point estimates of crime at the borough level, presenting a true picture of crime in England and Wales (as opposed to figures based on crime reports). The survey sample includes around 50,000 people each year. There was a good deal of controversy and debate around the measure, not least in that it was used to hold the police accountable yet was a measure of the performance of "the police and the local council" rather than just the police.

Replacing the emphasis on national targets, responsibility for performance management shifted to local police forces and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. These local authorities were tasked with planning, measuring progress, and developing action plans to make improvements in performance. In response, police forces developed strategic plans and ways to assess progress in implementing the plans that reflected the local partnership priorities. Set in the context of a recessionary

economy, maximizing value for money was central to the new policing plan, and localities were encouraged to set and scrutinize ambitious efficiency and productivity targets.

Responsibility for performance management has shifted from the national to the local level in England and Wales.

The value-for-money dimension has become increasingly sophisticated and has received new emphasis since the recent recession. As with the other dimensions, each force is compared with similar forces on a large number of measures. Among the measures are the per capita cost of officers, civilian staff, overtime expenditures, non-personnel costs, and staffing of various policing functions. An example of the UK's sophisticated value-for-money calculations is presented in [Appendix B](#).

Another Revision. The system of performance measurement is in the process of undergoing another substantial revision, prompted, in part, by budget cutbacks. The system under development, to be unveiled in spring 2012, will continue the devolvement of performance management from a centralized bureaucracy to local forces and councils. Instead of police authorities, every county police force will have an elected police and crime commissioner who will be empowered to fire police chief constables and create local strategic plans and performance measures. The effect of the change, which was scheduled to go into effect in May 2012, will be to allow local communities to react to poor police performance by holding the commissioner accountable at the ballot box.

The role of HMIC will undergo transformation as well. The commission has performed a national scanning function, giving support and intervening when forces show up on its radar as a result of poor performance. The intervention role will disappear, but a revised Police Report Card will be used to compare current and past performance and the current performance of similar forces. The public confidence measure will no longer be the national standard. Instead, the Home Office is in the process of developing a measure of the satisfaction of citizens who have had recent contact with the police. A new focus on quality would emphasize restorative justice outcomes in situations in which officers are able to exercise discretion.

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland has also been a leader in using performance metrics to monitor policing through the Northern Ireland Policing Board. Established in 2001, the board is an independent public body tasked with ensuring an effective, efficient, accountable, and impartial police service that has the confidence of the whole community, viz., both Catholics and Protestants. The board grew out of the 1998 Belfast Agreement and the recommendations of the Patten Commission. Among its major responsibilities are monitoring trends and patterns in crimes, setting objectives and targets for police

performance in cooperation with the chief constable, monitoring progress against these targets, and assessing the level of public satisfaction with the police.

The Northern Ireland Policing Board plan for 2010–2013 spans three domains: service excellence, tackling serious harm, and personal policing (i.e., dealing with local concerns).

In consultation with the Policing Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the board sets objectives and targets to be achieved in each of the domains. (See [Appendix C](#) for a list of measures in each domain.) Although the board has the ultimate statutory authority to determine objectives and targets, in practice, the process of setting aims has been largely a consensus effort. In fact, policing board staff reported that the chief constable has been a big supporter of the indicators, believing them to be an important tool to improve police performance.

Information used to construct the indicators comes from PSNI's overall statistics branch, which is fed data by district-level crime analysts responsible for quality control. There are several controls in place to ensure the integrity of the data supplied. The board has established a very strict set of rules to determine how events (e.g., reports of specific crimes, cases solved) are tallied. Adherence to these protocols is enforced through data audits conducted by an independent agency in which samples of crime reports, cleared cases, and so forth are collected and checked against district records to ensure that the events were properly categorized. The statisticians employed by the board are required to be members of a professional organization that sets standards of conduct for their work.

The Northern Ireland Policing Board has moved away from comparisons between the 29 police districts. This has largely been the result of objections by the police, who argue that the uniqueness of districts precludes facile comparisons and would only serve to confuse the public. Instead, the use of performance indicators to assess district commanders is up to local District Policing Partnerships. These partnerships, composed of members of the local community, monitor the performance of their district against local targets based on past performance.

The policing board's annual report presents the overall results of the review and whether targets were met for the past year. The annual report contains a scorecard that rates overall police performance on very specific measures under each objective and gives a pass/fail grade for each, as shown in [Table 4](#).

The Northern Ireland Policing Board also conducts two types of periodic surveys designed to monitor and improve police-community relations. Omnibus surveys have been conducted twice annually for the past decade, with a random sample of more than 1,000 households. These surveys query respondents about their confidence in the police and satisfaction with any recent experiences with the police. Reports available to the public display responses according to the country's two major religious groups—Catholics and Protestants—to evaluate any religious differences in support for the police. For the past few years, the board has also sent contact surveys by mail to persons

who have been victimized.

These surveys assess satisfaction with response times, treatment by police staff, and police follow-up. The results of both sets of surveys are available at the national level only and do not speak to how police performance is perceived at the district level.

The Northern Ireland Policing Board has instituted a strict protocol for tallying police performance.

New Zealand

New Zealand has a national set of performance measures that are tied to national policing strategies. In its *Statement of Intent 2010/11–2012/13*, the New Zealand Police (2010) set forth two strategic outcomes, or broad national goals:

- confident, safe, and secure communities
- less actual crime and road trauma, fewer victims.

These two broad goals are associated with more specific impacts. The statement describes initiatives—actions that the police plan to take—that correspond to each of the impacts, as shown in [Table 5](#).

Each impact has multiple indicators that determine whether the police are fulfilling the components of the strategic plan. Each indicator, in turn, has an associated measurement process. For example, the indicators associated with the second outcome, “less actual crime and road trauma, fewer victims,” require police crime statistics, transportation ministry statistics, and data from the New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey. (See [Appendix D](#) for a listing of indicators and data sources.)

Table 4

Achievement of Targets in Northern Ireland’s Annual Policing Plan, 2005–2006

Target	Performance	Target Achieved
1.1.1. To achieve a victim satisfaction rate of 75% for 2005–2006	PSNI/Northern Ireland Policing Board Victims Survey, quarters 1–3, 2005/2006: 80%	Achieved
1.2.1. To increase the percentage of people who think that the police do a good job by 5 percentage points	Omnibus survey: April 2005: 63% September 2005: 60% Average: 62%	Partially achieved

1.3.1. To increase the percentage of people who think that the police treat everyone equally by 5 percentage points	Omnibus survey: April 2005: 66% September 2005: 64%	Not achieved
1.4.1. To work toward establishing a baseline for measuring police response times to emergency calls, reporting to the Northern Ireland Policing Board quarterly	Within 5 minutes: 34.9% 5–9 minutes: 26.9% 10–14 minutes: 15.2% 15–19 minutes: 7.8% 20–24 minutes: 4.5% 25–29 minutes: 2.9% 30+ minutes: 7.9%	Achieved
SOURCE: Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2006, p. 39. Used with permission.		

Table 5
New Zealand Police Goals and Priority Initiatives

National Goals	Examples of Priority Initiatives
Confident, safe, and secure communities	
Confidence in the police is maintained; fear of crime, number of auto crashes are reduced	Changes in police code of conduct Target gangs and organized crime Increase visibility of police Rethink police deployment
New Zealand is seen as a safe, secure place to live, visit, work	Enhance intelligence-led policing Build links with Pacific region and global agencies Provide policing for major events
Increased public satisfaction with police services	Increase access to lines for reporting non-emergency crimes Ensure that victims are kept informed of status of investigation
Less actual crime and road trauma, fewer victims	
Less harm from crime and crashes	Use asset forfeiture against organized crime Increase sampling of DNA from arrestees Deploy automatic license plate recognition technology Zero tolerance for drunk-driving among youths

Vulnerable people are protected	Develop multiagency responses to child abuse Ensure better prioritization of cases, and improve case management
Abate increase in demand for justice services	Identify cohorts of citizens at risk of victimization and offending Promote alternatives to prosecution for low-level offenses
SOURCE: Based on information in New Zealand Police, 2010.	

Programs like New Zealand’s Alco-Link database allow police and partner agencies to strategically target resources.

The New Zealand Police also target other areas that incorporate performance indicators. One example is *promoting organizational health and capabilities*, which includes staff development, partnerships, and improving infrastructure. Among the indicators are officer surveys to determine officer job satisfaction and surveys of agencies with which the police are partnered to determine their satisfaction with the performance of the police in their partnership.

Another emphasis of strategic planning anchored by performance indicators is *reducing inequality*, with a particular emphasis on the Maori community, Pacific Islanders, and other ethnic groups. For example, a recent initiative sought to reduce crime and improve victim support in the Maori community.

Finally, an important part of the New Zealand Police strategic planning process is to reduce family violence, assaults, and sexual assaults linked to alcohol. There is a range of indicators associated with this aim, including measures drawn from community surveys and the Alco-Link database, which links offenders and victims to the locations of their most recent alcohol consumption. The database is produced from records of “last drink” information on custody/charge sheets and traffic offense notices. Alco-Link enables police and partner agencies to tightly target resources to “hot locations” linked to a disproportionate level of alcohol-related harm.


The New Zealand Police are in the process of developing indicators to quantify cost-outcome relationships for the two primary national goals: safe and secure communities and less crime and road trauma. The measures will attempt to identify outcomes that can be closely attributed to the police, recognizing that effective policing relies on a wide variety of partnerships.

South Africa

In South Africa, the new constitution put a strong emphasis on police oversight. The complex police oversight mechanisms in the country are bolstered by stringent

requirements to report on the force's performance. The South African Police Service (SAPS) is developing performance management charts to monitor individual police stations. As shown in Figure 1, the composite Eupolsa Index combines 32 measures in four domains of police services:

- *operational* (investigating complaints, emergency calls, offenses or alleged offenses, and bringing perpetrators to justice)
- *information* (the use of crime information extracted from computer databases)
- *resource* (allocation of personnel and vehicles, professional conduct, absenteeism)
- *customer orientation* (ability to satisfy customer needs or community expectations).



Twenty-three of the indicators are monitored monthly, four are assessed quarterly, and five are measured annually.

In addition to comparing performance across police stations, the system compares each station to its own previous performance. Targets are set for each station based on performance over the previous four years weighted in favor of recent months, and numerical scores are calculated based on the percentage of the target score achieved. The color-coded grading system is shown in Table 6. The “Result” column indicates the percentage of the target goal that was achieved on a scale of 0 to 100; the rating is a letter grade ranging from A to E, based on the numerical score; and the stars simply collapse the ratings into five broad categories from excellent to unacceptable.

An easy-to-read series of performance charts allows SAPS staff to analyze data at the provincial, station, and incident levels and to perform a quick analysis of relative improvement of various stations. (See the example in Table 7.)

The evidence indicates that there has been improvement in the prosecution rates of priority crimes. Not surprisingly, there has been cross-pollination between the UK and South African performance systems. Nonetheless, South Africa's system has been criticized for being too heavily weighted in favor of the operational dimension. Eighty-five percent of a station's overall score is derived from reported crimes, detection rates, cases filed in court, response times, and other operational indicators. The system has also been accused of encouraging abuse—or even the torture of suspects to extract confessions that lead to successful prosecutions—as a way to enhance performance numbers. Although community satisfaction is nominally a part of the Eupolsa Index, it does not affect the overall performance score and is largely unmeasured at most police stations (Faull, 2010).

The South African Police Service compares police stations to each other and to their own past performance.

Conclusions

This report examined some of the considerations involved in designing a system or performance measures and took a cursory look at how these concepts have been incorporated into some of the more advanced systems around the world. It is our belief that well-designed systems of performance indicators are an essential part of holding the police accountable to government, civil society, and the public at large. As the success of the New York Police Department's CompStat program demonstrated, the collection and effective use of performance indicators can have a major impact on the culture of police organizations. CompStat made it possible for the department to set ambitious goals, to continually monitor progress toward those goals, and, eventually, to spur its officers to higher levels of accomplishment and foster a revitalized organizational culture (Bratton, 1999).

Table 6 **SAPS Performance Grading System**

Result (%)	Grade	Rating	Outcome
95–100	★ ★ ★ ★ ★	A+	Excellent
90–94.99	★ ★ ★ ★ ★	A	
85–89.99	★ ★ ★ ★ ★	A–	
80–84.99	★ ★ ★ ★	B+	Good
75–79.99	★ ★ ★ ★	B	
70–74.99	★ ★ ★ ★	B–	
65–69.99	★ ★ ★	C+	Satisfactory
60–64.99	★ ★ ★	C	
50–59.99	★ ★ ★	C–	
45–49.99	★ ★	D+	Poor
40–44.99	★ ★	D	
35–39.99	★ ★	D–	
30–34.99	★	E+	Unacceptable
20–29.99	★	E	
0–19.99	★	E–	
SOURCE: SAPS data.			

Table 7
Example SAPS Performance Chart

Province	Result (%)	Grade	Rating	Outcome
KwaZulu Natal	71.18	★ ★ ★ ★	B–	Good
Limpopo	64.59	★ ★ ★	C	Satisfactory
Eastern Cape	61.77	★ ★ ★	C	Satisfactory
Northern Cape	58.33	★ ★ ★	C–	Satisfactory
Western Cape	56.91	★ ★ ★	C–	Satisfactory
North West	55.00	★ ★ ★	C–	Satisfactory
Mpumalanga	53.61	★ ★ ★	C–	Satisfactory
Gauteng	53.04	★ ★ ★	C–	Satisfactory
Free State	52.47	★ ★ ★	C–	Satisfactory
SAPS	58.54	★ ★ ★	C–	Satisfactory
SOURCE: SAPS data.				
NOTE: The table shows performance in the third quarter of 2004–2005.				

Modern thinking about performance measures, as embodied in the international examples presented here, incorporates several central concepts. First, performance measures should be developed within a framework of democratic policing. They need to assess effective crime control and—especially in this era of global fiscal restraint—judicious use of public funds. However, this approach must be balanced by a concern for the rights of citizens who have encounters with the police, either as a result of requests for assistance or as a result of being stopped by an officer. To promote legitimacy, the police need to treat both of these groups in a respectful manner, such as by using minimal force against those who have involuntary contact with the police. In the long run, increased legitimacy acts in favor of the police, who rely on public cooperation to

solve crimes and, more generally, to maintain the rule of law (see, e.g., De Cremer and Tyler, 2007).

Second, while countries will want to set national standards for police performance, those standards should be flexible and relatively few in number. National targets should consist of broad socially desirable policing outcomes—for example, Northern Ireland’s use of opinion surveys to track and compare the extent of support for the police among Catholics relative to Protestants. It should be left to local police forces to determine how best to meet national targets while maintaining the flexibility to set their own performance goals that respond to the needs of local citizens. The latest revision to the comprehensive British system of performance measurement recognizes the importance allowing localities to set their own targets and create their own measures to promote police accountability to local officials and the local electorate.

Finally, performance measures should include a mix of outcomes and outputs. As noted in this report, many socially desirable outcomes are not under the direct control of the police: Society cares more about convictions than arrests, but good police work cannot guarantee that an arrest results in a conviction. On the other hand, outputs, such as the number of traffic stops, are under the exclusive control of the police, but their overuse tends to distort views of how officers spend their time and may result in efforts to game the system. Given the limitations of traditional measures of police outcomes and outputs, measures based on surveys combine some of the strengths of both classes. Surveys can measure desirable outcomes, such as officer morale or the respectful treatment of citizens, that *are* under direct control of police agencies. Moreover, the results of surveys often have less ambiguous interpretations than more traditional measures, such as citizen complaints. For these reasons, surveys are becoming an important tool that modern police forces are employing.

There have been many arguments against attempts to develop performance measurement systems. These arguments are both conceptual and practical. On the conceptual side, critics argue that measures may be ambiguous, that they distort officer behavior in undesirable ways, and that it is not possible to make comparisons between units or agencies because their operating environments are unique. All of these criticisms have validity. Nonetheless, it is our belief that a well-crafted suite of performance measures can, at a minimum, point out potential problems that could be verified by more thorough investigation.

Synthetic controls offer a solution to the difficulty of comparing police performance across agencies.

While this report focused on the development of a measurement system, it did not address the issues of setting benchmarks, or determining the level at which a police department or unit should perform, given its circumstances. The problem of finding similar units or agencies against which to make comparisons has been mitigated by the

development of the concept of “synthetic controls.” Synthetic controls involve comparing a unit’s cases to comparison cases purposefully selected from a range of other units in order to maximize their similarity. Instead of having to find another identical unit (which is problematic in most circumstances), the synthetic control approach constructs a virtual comparison unit by drawing individual observations from a number of other units (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).

The practical arguments against performance measures center mainly on cost and technological incapacity. Following Klockars (1999), this report has argued that a rudimentary set of performance indicators does not have to be costly, and even a basic set of measures can provide police managers with the tools to strengthen accountability. Technological capability is, of course, necessary to construct indicators. But modern dispatch systems, record management systems, early warning systems, and a host of other capabilities that are being developed for law enforcement are continually increasing the ease of producing measures and broadening the range of indicators that can be created.

As demands grow for police to perform more functions with greater efficiency, performance indicators will continue to advance in complexity. Judicious selection and use of these indicators offers new opportunities to create a culture of accountability to elected officials and the public at large. ■

¹ While these process measures are the least expensive to generate among the three types of measures described here, they do assume the existence of rudimentary recordkeeping systems. For agencies that do not have these basic capabilities, collecting this information would require an additional financial commitment.

Appendix A. HMIC Report Card

This appendix presents an excerpt from the HMIC Report Card for the Merseyside Police, a police force that oversees law enforcement in the city of Liverpool and surrounding areas in northwestern England. The material is reproduced here in accordance with the Open Government License and is protected by Crown Copyright. The data reflect results released on March 13, 2010.

Here we tell you how well your police force is performing when compared to similar forces around England and Wales. Your police force is **Merseyside Police**.



Overall Assessment by Inspector Roger Baker

Merseyside Police has, over a sustained period, reduced crimes that matter locally to the public, such as violence, burglary and criminal damage. The force performs well against its peers in crime reduction and for the level of crimes solved. It has fewer burglaries and solves more crimes of violence. The force has already recognised the need to improve its burglary detection rate which is beginning to decline.

Like many other forces, Merseyside will face a challenging financial future.

Merseyside is a medium-sized force which uses its money well but costs more per head of population than its peers in employing more uniformed police officers as well as significant investment in specialist policing units which tackle organised crime investigations at a local, national and international level.

The area covered by Merseyside Police stretches from the Wirral in the south to Sefton in the north, which includes significant stretches of coastline. Around a third of the 1.4 million population live in Liverpool and 97.1% classify themselves as “white.” Merseyside manages significant levels of visitors to its sporting, cultural and heritage attractions each year. This peaked during 2008 as part of its status as International Capital of Culture.

A strong focus on anti-social behaviour (ASB), together with the creation of a “task force” to support local divisions, has led to a fall in the number of ASB incidents reported, and a reduction in the proportion of people believing it to be a problem. Partnership working generally, and in particular around ASB, is strong.

The force takes the national lead on a number of aspects of serious crime and has performed well against its peers in tackling guns and organised crime, as well as major crime. Supported by strong chief officer leadership, staff have the skills, equipment and expertise to meet the demands placed on them. Merseyside has nationally recognised expertise, being regularly involved in tackling top-level serious crime, including drug trafficking. Merseyside's ability to manage the threat and risk of major incidents is recognised.

Merseyside has regularly demonstrated the effectiveness of its specialist policing units and a flexibility of approach in tackling emerging problems. Recent diversion of officers into tackling gun crime, away from asset seizure, provided a quick and effective response to emerging issues.

There remain some areas for improvement including a need to reduce the numbers of deaths and serious injuries arising from road traffic accidents. It is also beginning to improve its performance around the management and detection of serious sexual offences.

Merseyside was one of only eight forces last year to be graded as "Good" in its delivery on the Policing Pledge; promises covering the local police response to the public in need and distress. Notable areas were in communicating with and responding to communities, as well as care for victims.

While general public satisfaction among "users" of the police service is in line with peers, black and minority ethnic (BME) people are less satisfied than their white counterparts. This has been an historic problem which the force is addressing. Despite this, confidence and satisfaction rates are higher than comparable forces.

As with many other forces, Merseyside will face a challenging financial future and has already begun to determine priorities for maintaining front line services whilst seeking efficiencies and savings elsewhere.

HMIC's Assessment of Performance and Prospect of Improvement

HMIC inspects how forces perform in a range of activities and against a number of agreed standards. HMIC's assessment of performance for each of these activities is shown below.

HMIC also makes a professional assessment of whether the force's performance is likely to improve or decline in the future, for some indicators.

Local crime and policing

Neighbourhood policing	NOT MEETING STANDARD	MEETING STANDARD	EXCEEDING STANDARD	
Neighbourhood presence	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT
Reducing crime	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT —
Solving crimes	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT —

Protection from serious harm

Investigating major crime	NOT MEETING STANDARD	MEETING STANDARD	EXCEEDING STANDARD	
Reducing road death and injury	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT —
Solving serious sexual offences	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT
Suppressing gun crime	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT —
Suppressing knife crime	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT

Confidence and satisfaction

Comparative satisfaction of BME community	POOR	FAIR	GOOD/EXCELLENT	—
Meeting the Pledge Standards	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT
Perceptions of anti-social behaviour	POOR	FAIR	GOOD/EXCELLENT	—
Public confidence: all agencies	POOR	FAIR	GOOD/EXCELLENT	—
Public confidence: police	POOR	FAIR	GOOD/EXCELLENT	—
Satisfaction with service delivery	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLENT ▲

Value for money: staffing and costs

Cost of policing	LOW	LOW/MEDIUM	MEDIUM/HIGH	HIGH
Cost per household	LOW	LOW/MEDIUM	MEDIUM/HIGH	HIGH
Number of police officers and police community support officers	LOW	LOW/MEDIUM	MEDIUM/HIGH	HIGH
Proportion of policing cost met from council tax	LOW	LOW/MEDIUM	MEDIUM/HIGH	HIGH


Appendix B. Sample UK Value-for-Money Assessment

This appendix presents an excerpt from the July 2010 HMIC report *Valuing the Police: Policing in an Age of Austerity*. The material is reproduced here in accordance with the Open Government License and is protected by Crown Copyright.

Over time, savings of around £1.15 billion (equating to 12% of central government funding) may be achievable by improving productivity and cutting costs. Benchmarking of costs, using HMIC's Value for Money profiles and Police Objective Analysis data identifies high variation in spend per force across a range of functions and services. [Figure B.1] shows the sum of costs for police forces that exceed those of forces in similar circumstances. Fieldwork in four sample forces suggests that, in most cases, variation could translate into savings through business change.

It is important to recognise that the potential for savings is not spread evenly and forces all start out from different places. Forces have different contracts and histories which do not make elimination of large variation in cost straightforward or achievement of the lowest spend, in short order, easy.

Figure B.1
Average Variation in Spending from Average, All Forces



Appendix C. Northern Ireland Policing Board's Objectives, Performance Indicators, and Targets

This appendix presents a summary sample of performance indicators and targets used by the Northern Ireland Policing Board to assess police performance.

Table C.1
Service Excellence Indicators and Targets

Performance Indicators	Targets
1. Number of officers assigned to frontline service delivery roles	1.1. To increase the number of police officers assigned to neighborhood and response policing roles by 600
2. Percentage of time spent by police officers on operational duty outside police stations	2.1. To increase the percentage of time spent by police officers on operational duty outside stations by 6 percentage points
3. Percentage of people who agree that the police and other agencies are dealing with antisocial behavior and crime issues that matter in local areas	3.1. To increase the percentage of people who agree that the police and other agencies are dealing with antisocial behavior and crime issues that matter in local areas to 60% by March 31, 2012
4. Proportion of crimes reported to the police	4.1. To ensure that the proportion of crimes reported to the police reaches 50% by March 31, 2011
5. Level of confidence in the fairness and effectiveness of the criminal justice system	5.1. In partnership with other agencies, to increase the percentage of people confident in the fairness of the criminal justice system to 38% by March 31, 2011
SOURCE: Adapted from Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2010, pp. 11–12. Used with permission.	

Table C.2
Tackling Serious Harm Indicators and Targets

Performance Indicators	Targets
6. Impact on organized crime	6.1. To report four times per year on the number of organized crime gangs frustrated, disrupted and

	dismantled 6.2. To increase the number of PSNI interventions directed at criminal finances
7. Level of violence with injury	7.1. To reduce the number of non-domestic violence with injury crimes by 5%
8. Detection rate for violence with injury	8.1. To increase the detection rate for violence with injury crimes by 10 percentage points
9. Number of people killed or seriously injured on the road	9.1. In partnership with other agencies, to contribute to reducing the number of people killed or seriously injured on the road 9.2. In partnership with other agencies, to contribute to reducing the number of children killed or seriously injured on the road
10. Percentage of recorded crimes detected	10.1. To increase the detection rate for Domestic violence with injury crimes by 10 percentage points Most serious sexual crime by 5 percentage points Sectarian crime by 5 percentage points Racist crime by 5 percentage points Homophobic crime by 10 percentage points Robbery by 5 percentage points
SOURCE: Adapted from Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2010, pp. 11–14. Used with permission.	

Table C.3
Personal Policing (Dealing with Local Concerns) Indicators and Targets

Performance Indicators	Targets
11. Number of incidents of antisocial behavior	11.1. To reduce the number of incidents of antisocial behavior to ensure a 15% reduction by March 31, 2011
12. Number of burglaries	12.1. To reduce the number of domestic burglaries by 5% 12.2. To reduce the number of non-domestic burglaries by 5%
13. Detection rate for burglary	13.1. To increase the detection rate for burglary by 5 percentage points

SOURCE: Adapted from Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2010, pp. 14–15. Used with permission.

Appendix D. New Zealand Police Indicators and Measures

This appendix presents a summary of indicators and measures used by the New Zealand Police to assess performance with regard to the force's first strategic outcome: confident, safe, and secure communities.

For further general reading on police performance measures, see Couper (1983), Hoover (1996), Maguire (2004), Moore and Braga (2003), USAID (2011, sec. 5), Vera Institute of Justice (2003), and Volaard (2006).

Table D.1

Indicators and Measures Associated with Confident, Safe, and Secure Communities

Outcome	Indicators	Measured by
Confident, safe, and secure communities	Trust and confidence in the police	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
Impacts	Indicators	Measured by
Confidence in the police is maintained, fear of crime and crashes is reduced	Police are involved in activities in my community	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
	People who had contact with the police felt that, in the end, they got what they needed	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
	Feelings of safety in the neighborhood (daytime)	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
	Feelings of safety in the neighborhood (after dark)	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
	Feelings of safety in town center (after dark)	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
	Percentage of the public worried about being involved in a traffic accident caused by a drink driver	New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey

New Zealand is seen as a safe and secure place to live, visit, and conduct business	Organizations reporting actual occurrences of economic crime (conducted biannually)	Pricewaterhouse Coopers
	Level of satisfaction among visitors with personal safety in urban areas	Tourism New Zealand Visitor Experience Monitor
	Level of satisfaction among visitors with personal safety in rural areas	Tourism New Zealand Visitor Experience Monitor
	Level of satisfaction among visitors with road safety	Tourism New Zealand Visitor Experience Monitor
	The police support New Zealand's international objectives by contributing to international cooperative security	Police participation in capacity-building activities
Public, especially victims of crime, express satisfaction with police service	Overall satisfaction with service delivery among members of the public who had contact with the police	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
	People who had contact with the police whose expectations of service delivery were met or exceeded	Citizens' Satisfaction Survey
	Victims' overall satisfaction with the police response	New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey
	Victims viewing the police less favorably after reporting	New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey
SOURCE: Adapted from New Zealand Police, 2010, p. 16, Table 1 . Used in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 New Zealand license.		

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